

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAIRE DELACRUZ, individually,
and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

CYTOSPORT, INC., a California
Corporation,

Defendant.

No. C 11-3532 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN
PART AND DENYING
IN PART
CYTOSPORT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Docket No. 14)

Plaintiff Claire Delacruz alleges a putative consumer class action based on certain representations made regarding Defendant Cytosport's products, "Muscle Milk® Ready-To-Drink" (RTD) and "Muscle Milk® Bars." Plaintiff alleges claims under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the False Advertising Law (FAL), as well as common law claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (1AC) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 9(b), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6).

Having considered all of the parties' submissions and oral argument, the Court grants in part Defendant's motion to dismiss and denies it in part. Docket No. 14.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's 1AC alleges the following. Defendant manufactures and markets Muscle Milk® products, including the RTD and the bars. The 1AC refers to both as the Products. Plaintiff claims,

In connection with its marketing of the Products, as part of an extensive and long-term advertising campaign, including communications through product packaging, television, print, outdoor, and other media, Cytosport makes representations and omissions that are intended to mislead consumers to believe that the Products are healthy, and nutritious, and should be regularly consumed to help them diet and live a healthy lifestyle.

Contrary to Defendant's representations and omissions, however, with almost 50% of their caloric content coming from fats, the Products are equivalent to fat-laden junk food. Defendant tells consumers "there's no question you're getting a nutritious snack," and that the Products "take[] the guess work out of high performance nutrition," yet a standard-size container of Cytosport's "Muscle Milk® Ready-To-Drink (RTD)" contains the same number of calories and almost as much total fat and saturated fat as a "Glazed Kreme Filling" Krispy Kreme® doughnut, and more fat and saturated fat than other varieties of Krispy Kreme® doughnuts. Similarly, Cytosport's 73 gram "Muscle Milk® Bars" contain more calories, more saturated fat, and the same amount of total fat as a roughly equal-sized 72 gram "Chocolate Iced Glazed" Krispy Kreme® doughnut.

Defendant expressly represents that the Products are "premium," "healthy," "nutritional" products that should be consumed as part of a "healthy lifestyle," before workouts, after workouts, and as a "meal replacement" to provide "healthy sustained energy."

1AC at ¶¶ 2-4.

The 1AC includes photographs of two RTD containers, a seventeen ounce RTD and a fourteen ounce RTD, as well as other

1 advertisements for the drink. The fourteen ounce container
2 states,

3 MUSCLE MILK IS AN IDEAL BLEND
4 OF PROTEIN, HEALTHY FATS,
5 GOOD CARBOHYDRATES
6 AND 20 VITAMINS AND MINERALS
7 TO PROVIDE SUSTAINED ENERGY,
8 SPUR LEAN MUSCLE GROWTH AND HELP PROVIDE RECOVERY
9 FROM TOUGH DAYS
10 AND TOUGHER WORKOUTS.

11 1AC at ¶ 17.

12 Plaintiff alleges that "healthy fats" and "good
13 carbohydrates" are false and misleading terms. 1AC at ¶ 18.

14 The misrepresentations on the container are compounded by
15 misrepresentations on the product website, Plaintiff claims. The
16 website states, "No matter if you are a performance athlete,
17 exercise enthusiast, or just trying to live a healthy lifestyle,
18 Muscle Milk is an ideal [product] for your nutritional needs."

19 1AC at ¶ 19. In addition, the website claims that the RTD is a
20 "functional beverage that promotes recovery from exercise, lean
21 muscle growth, and healthy, sustained energy." 1AC at ¶ 19. The
22 website also states, "Ready-to-Drink is an ideal nutritional
23 choice [if] you are . . . on a diet." 1AC at ¶ 19. The 1AC
24 includes an image from the website.

25 Defendant also conducted a transit media campaign for the
26 RTD. The advertisements appeared on buses, on top of taxis and in
27 trains, stating, "Go from cover it up to take it off," "From
28 invisible to OMG!" and "From frumpy to fabulous." 1AC at ¶ 22.

1 They led consumers to believe that the RTD is healthy and would
2 help them lose weight.

3 Plaintiff alleges,

4 To increase sales and profits from [the above-mentioned]
5 misrepresentations, Cytosport also instructs consumers
6 on "How to use Muscle Milk," telling them to use it to
7 meet their "nutritional goals" and to use it multiple
8 times a day, including "1.5-2 hours prior to training,"
9 "30-45 minutes after workouts," as a "meal replacement,"
10 and "in between meals as a protein-enhanced snack," and
11 even "in conjunction with meals."

12 1AC at ¶ 23. The 1AC does not allege where these particular
13 statements are made.

14 In addition to claims regarding the RTD, the 1AC contains
15 specific allegations related to the bars, including an image of
16 the product packaging. Plaintiff claims that the "Healthy,
17 Sustained Energy" and "0g Trans Fat" language on the front of the
18 package is misleading, 1AC at ¶¶ 25, 32, and that, as with the
19 RTD, misrepresentations regarding the bars are compounded by the
20 representations Defendant makes about them on its website, 1AC
21 ¶ 34. The website allegedly states that when customers consume
22 the bars "there's no question [they are] getting a nutritious
23 snack," and that "Muscle Milk Bars deliver . . . healthy sustained
24 energy." 1AC ¶ 34. According to Plaintiff, this is misleading
25 because the bars contain "11 grams of total fat (one third of the
26 total caloric content), 8 grams of saturated fat and almost no
27 vitamins and minerals." 1AC at ¶ 26. Further, the bars "actually
28 contain unhealthy ingredients like fractionated palm kernel oil,
and partially hydrogenated palm oil." 1AC at ¶ 28. Plaintiff

1 states that palm oil is high in saturated fat and is often used as
2 a substitute for partially hydrogenated vegetable oil (i.e. trans
3 fat). 1AC at ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleges that studies have suggested
4 that palm oil may be just as unhealthy as trans fats, 1AC at ¶ 29,
5 and claims that fractionated palm kernel oil is the least healthy
6 variety of palm oil and that the healthful aspects of palm oil are
7 largely lost in the processing of palm kernel oil and fractionated
8 palm kernel oil, 1AC at ¶ 30. Plaintiff also claims that "the
9 World Health Organization has convincingly linked palmitic acid,
10 which is present in palm oil, to increased risk of cardiovascular
11 disease," 1AC at ¶ 29. The American Heart Association states that
12 palm oil and palm kernel oil "contain primarily saturated fats,"
13 and recommends limiting saturated fat intake to less than seven
14 percent of one's total daily calories 1AC at ¶¶ 27 and 31.
15 Plaintiff alleges that "the consumption of saturated fats has been
16 shown to cause heart disease and other serious health problems."
17 1AC at ¶ 27. However, Plaintiff does not allege that any amount
18 of saturated fat renders a product unhealthy.

19 Plaintiff claims that she "regularly purchased and consumed"
20 Muscle Milk® RTD and the bars during the six months prior to
21 filing the initial complaint. 1AC at ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleges
22 that she "was exposed" to Defendant's long-term advertising
23 campaign concerning the products, including the product packaging.
24 1AC ¶ 38. She alleges that "but for" Defendant's
25 misrepresentations and omissions, she would not have purchased and
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1 consumed the products. 1AC ¶ 38. She further claims that she was
2 denied the benefit of her bargain when she decided to purchase the
3 products over competitor products, which are less expensive or
4 contain healthier ingredients. Plaintiff claims that she would
5 not have paid as much as she did for the products, or she would
6 not have purchased the products at all, had she been aware of the
7 misrepresentations. 1AC at ¶¶ 66, 76, 84, 95, 101, 110 and 112.
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9 Other factual assertions discussed by the parties in their
10 briefing are not plead in the 1AC. Specifically, Plaintiff points
11 out that Defendant has represented in other litigation that it has
12 spent millions of dollars promoting and advertising Muscle Milk®
13 RTD and the Muscle Milk® brand generally.¹ Plaintiff also notes
14 that, on June 29, 2011, the FDA sent a Warning Letter to Defendant
15 after having reviewed the labels for Defendant's "Chocolate Muscle
16 Milk Protein Nutrition Shake," (fourteen ounce) and the webpage
17 for Muscle Milk® Bars. Declaration of G. Charles Nierlich in
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19 ¹ The Court grants Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice of
20 Exhibit A, a declaration by Roberta White, Defendant's Vice
21 President of Corporate Development, submitted in a different
22 action, because it is not subject to reasonable dispute, under
23 Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). In ruling on a motion to
24 dismiss, the court may consider matters which may be judicially
25 noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, including
26 records from other proceedings. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary
27 Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, the
28 representations as to the amount of advertising are Defendant's
own. White Dec. at ¶ 23. The statement may support Plaintiff's
allegations about Defendant's long-term advertising campaign, even
if the representations are not specific to the precise
misrepresentations alleged here. However, this information is not
in the complaint and so does not contribute to the complaint's
sufficiency.

1 Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A. The FDA
2 stated that, among other violations of the Federal Food, Drug and
3 Cosmetic Act and applicable regulations, the label for the shake
4 and its webpage impermissibly included the claim "Healthy,
5 Sustained Energy" without meeting the requirements for the use of
6 the nutrient content claim, "healthy." The FDA also stated that
7 the website for the bars contained the claim "healthy, sustained
8 energy," although they have more fat and saturated fat than
9 permitted by food branding regulations. This information is not
10 alleged in the complaint and thus cannot be used to argue that the
11 complaint is sufficient.

12 LEGAL STANDARD

13 I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

14 Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue which goes
15 to the power of the court to hear the case. Federal subject
16 matter jurisdiction must exist at the time the action is
17 commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of
18 Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal
19 court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction until the
20 contrary affirmatively appears. Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated
21 Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

22 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the
23 district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Because challenges to standing
25 implicate a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction under
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1 Article III of the United States Constitution, they are properly
2 raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). White v. Lee,
3 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

4 II. Sufficiency of Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)

5 A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the
6 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.
7 Civ. P. 8(a). On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
8 state a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint
9 does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable
10 claim and the grounds on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
11 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering whether the
12 complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court will take all
13 material allegations as true and construe them in the light most
14 favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d
15 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). However, this principle is inapplicable
16 to legal conclusions; "threadbare recitals of the elements of a
17 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not
18 taken as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)
19 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

22 When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally
23 required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request
24 to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile.
25 Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911
26 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether
27 amendment would be futile, the court examines whether the
28

1 complaint could be amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal
2 "without contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original
3 complaint." Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th
4 Cir. 1990).

5 III. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

6 "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
7 constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). "It is well-settled that the Federal Rules
9 of Civil Procedure apply in federal court, 'irrespective of the
10 source of the subject matter jurisdiction, and irrespective of
11 whether the substantive law at issue is state or federal.'"

12 Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009)
13 (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th
14 Cir. 2003). The allegations must be "specific enough to give
15 defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to
16 constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the
17 charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong."

18 Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Statements
19 of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities
20 are sufficient, id. at 735, provided the plaintiff sets forth
21 "what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is
22 false." In re GlenFed, Inc., Secs. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548
23 (9th Cir. 1994).
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DISCUSSION

I. Allegations of False and Misleading Statements

While Plaintiff's standing is necessary to the Court's jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is a threshold question, Defendant's standing arguments merge with its arguments that Plaintiff fails to state a claim, so the Court addresses the latter first.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege any false or misleading statement under the UCL, CLRA and FAL or her common law claims for fraud or negligent misrepresentation. Claims of deceptive labeling under these California statutes are evaluated by whether a "reasonable consumer" would be likely to be deceived. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995)). Common law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation similarly require that the consumer justifiably rely on a representation that is false or subject to a misleading omission. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 990 (2004) (common law fraud); Century Sur. Co. v. Crosby Ins., Inc., 124 Cal. App. 4th 116, 129 (2004) (negligent misrepresentation).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to claims sounding in fraud under the common law and statutory law, requiring particularized pleading of alleged false statements, and the basis for the claim of falsity. Plaintiff claims that the

1 product labels include misrepresentations. In Williams, upon
2 which Plaintiff relies, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
3 court's dismissal of a consumer class action under the UCL, CLRA
4 and FAL for failure to allege cognizable misrepresentations. 552
5 F.3d at 934. The action arose from allegedly deceptive packaging
6 for "Fruit Juice Snacks," a food product developed for toddlers.
7 The district court dismissed the claim after reviewing an example
8 of the packaging and finding that "no reasonable consumer upon
9 review of the package as a whole would conclude that Snacks
10 contains juice from the actual and fruit-like substances displayed
11 on the packaging particularly where the ingredients are
12 specifically identified." Id. at 939.

14 The Ninth Circuit, however, found a number of features on the
15 packaging that would likely deceive a reasonable consumer.
16 Specifically, the product was called "Fruit Juice Snacks" and the
17 packaging depicted a number of different fruits, "potentially
18 suggesting (falsely) that those fruits or their juices are
19 contained in the product." Id. In addition, consumers could
20 easily interpret the statement that Fruit Juice Snacks were made
21 with "fruit juice and other all natural ingredients" to mean "that
22 all the ingredients in the product were natural," which was
23 alleged to be false. Id. Finally, the claim that the product is
24 "just one of a variety of nutritious Gerber Graduates foods and
25 juices that have been specifically designed to help toddlers grow
26 up strong and healthy" added to the potential deception. Id.

1 The court acknowledged that "nutritiousness" is "difficult to
2 measure concretely," but because the statement that the product
3 was "nutritious" contributed "to the deceptive context of the
4 packaging as a whole," the court declined to give the defendant
5 "the benefit of the doubt by dismissing the statement as puffery."
6 Id. at 939 n.3.

7
8 Plaintiff and Defendant both rely on Yumul v. Smart Balance,
9 Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010). There, the plaintiff
10 claimed that the defendant's margarine packaging violated the UCL,
11 CLRA and FAL because it stated that the product was "healthy" and
12 "cholesterol free," although it contained artificial trans fat
13 raising the level of "bad" LDL blood cholesterol and lowering the
14 level of "good" HDL blood cholesterol. The court found that the
15 plaintiff could prove that the packaging, including the "no
16 cholesterol" statement, "could lead a reasonable consumer to
17 conclude that the product contained no trans fat, i.e., that it
18 would not increase LDL blood cholesterol levels." 733 F. Supp. 2d
19 at 1129. The court noted that the term "healthy," like the term
20 "nutritious" in Williams, was "difficult, if not impossible, to
21 measure concretely," but refused to dismiss the claim for lack of
22 an alleged misrepresentation. Id. at 1129-30.

23
24 Of the words and phrases on the product labels to which
25 Plaintiff points, the only one that is particularly claimed to be
26 false, analogous to the "fruit juice" statements in Williams, is
27 the term "healthy fats" on the fourteen ounce Muscle Milk® RTD
28

1 label. This representation is more specific than simply that the
2 product is healthy. As between saturated fats and unsaturated
3 fats, the latter is the healthy fat. A reasonable consumer would
4 be likely to believe that the drink contains unsaturated, not
5 saturated, fats. The drink container also states that it is a
6 "nutritional shake." This representation, while "difficult to
7 measure concretely" like a similar claim in Williams, contributes
8 to a sufficient claim of deceptive product labeling.
9

10 Defendant contends that no reasonable consumer could be
11 misled in light of the nutrient label on the package. This
12 argument is not persuasive. As the Williams court said,

13 We do not think that the FDA requires an ingredient
14 list so that manufacturers can mislead consumers and
15 then rely on the ingredient list to correct those
16 misinterpretations and provide a shield for liability
17 for the deception. Instead, reasonable consumers
18 expect that the ingredient list contains more detailed
19 information about the product that confirms other
20 representations on the packaging.

21 552 F.3d at 939-40. Yumul similarly ruled that "where product
22 packaging contains an affirmative misrepresentation, the
23 manufacturer cannot rely on the small-print nutritional label to
24 contradict and cure that misrepresentation." 733 F. Supp. 2d at
25 1129.

26 Plaintiff alleges that the "Healthy, Sustained Energy" claim
27 on the RTD seventeen ounce container is false and misleading.
28 However, the term "healthy" is difficult to define and Plaintiff
has not alleged that the drink contains unhealthy amounts of fat,

1 saturated fat or calories from fat, compared to its protein
2 content, based on any objective criteria. While Plaintiff alleges
3 that Muscle Milk® RTD contains unspecified amounts of saturated
4 fat that are equal to or exceed that in certain Krispy Kreme
5 doughnuts, this analogy is not helpful. Plaintiff does not
6 explain how much protein, vitamins and minerals are in such a
7 doughnut or posit an objectively healthy ratio of protein to fat.
8 Plaintiff has not alleged sufficiently that representing the drink
9 as "healthy" on the RTD label was false and misleading.
10

11 Plaintiff also challenges the "Healthy, Sustained Energy"
12 language on the label for the bars. However, that label reads,
13 "25g PROTEIN FOR HEALTHY, SUSTAINED ENERGY." Plaintiff does not
14 claim that the bars do not contain twenty-five grams of protein.
15 Plaintiff alleges that the bars label is misleading because it
16 contains the claim "0g Trans Fat" while the bars actually contain
17 saturated fat, fractionated palm kernel oil and partially
18 hydrogenated palm oil. However, she does not allege that these
19 fats are trans fats.
20

21 Plaintiff also alleges misrepresentations made as part of
22 Defendant's advertising. It is not clear what misrepresentations
23 she refers to. To the extent that the claim is based on
24 statements included in transit advertising, namely, "Go from cover
25 it up to take it off," "From invisible to OMG!" and "From frumpy
26 to fabulous," these statements are non-actionable puffery.
27
28 Haskell v. Time, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (E.D. Cal. 1994)

1 ("The distinguishing characteristics of puffery are vague, highly
2 subjective claims as opposed to specific, detailed factual
3 assertions.").

4 Finally, Plaintiff complains of statements on Defendant's
5 website, such as "Ready-to-Drink is an ideal nutritional choice
6 [if] you are . . . on a diet." The word "ideal" is vague, highly
7 subjective, and non-actionable, like "superb, uncompromising
8 quality," addressed in Oesteicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F. Supp.
9 2d 964, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2008), and "high-performance" and "top of
10 the line," addressed in Brothers v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2006 WL
11 3093685, at *4-*5 (N.D. Cal. 2006). In addition, Plaintiff
12 alleges that the website description of Muscle Milk® Bars contains
13 the same misleading claims that it is a "nutritious snack" that
14 delivers "healthy, sustained energy." These statements are
15 addressed above.
16

17
18 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has concealed material facts
19 about its products, but does not specify what has been concealed
20 and why it is material.

21 In sum, the sole cognizable misrepresentation that Plaintiff
22 has plead is the "healthy fats" statement on the fourteen ounce
23 Muscle Milk® RTD container, buttressed by the "nutritious snack"
24 statement.

25 II. Injury

26
27 To assert a claim under the UCL and FAL, a private plaintiff
28 must have lost money or property as a result of the violations.

1 Kwikset v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 321-22 (2011) (citing
2 the UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204, and "materially identical
3 language" in the FAL, § 17535). Likewise, a plaintiff suing under
4 the CLRA must allege damage, although the damage need not be
5 economic. See Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 45 Cal. 4th 634,
6 641 (2009). To state a claim for fraud at common law, the alleged
7 victim must have incurred damage as a result of the fraudulent
8 deception. In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009).

9
10 Plaintiff's complaint alleges an economic injury. She claims
11 that she was denied the benefit of her bargain. She asserts
12 economic harm based on the purchase of the products over less
13 expensive, healthier competitive products, and claims that she
14 would not have paid as much as she did, or would not have
15 purchased the products at all, had she been aware of the
16 misrepresentations.

17
18 Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 323-25, 329-31, supports the adequacy
19 of Plaintiff's allegations of injury. In Kwikset, the California
20 Supreme Court stated, "A consumer who relies on a product label
21 and challenges a misrepresentation contained therein can satisfy
22 the standing requirement of [the UCL] by alleging . . . that he or
23 she would not have bought the product but for the
24 misrepresentation." Id. at 330. The court further explained that
25 the allegation that the consumer paid more than he or she actually
26 valued the product was such that the "extra money paid" amounted
27
28

1 to an economic injury. Id. at 331. See also, Degelmann v.
2 Advanced Med. Optics Inc., 659 F.3d 835, 839-840 (9th Cir. 2011).

3 Plaintiff's allegations of injury are sufficient to claim
4 that she lost money based on the alleged misrepresentations.

5 III. Reliance

6 A plaintiff seeking to prosecute a UCL and FAL claim is
7 required to demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive
8 or misleading statements. Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 326. The CLRA
9 imposes a requirement that a violation "caus[e] or result[] in
10 some sort of damage." Meyer, 45 Cal. 4th at 641. Common law
11 fraud requires that the victim show reasonable reliance on the
12 allegedly deceptive representation. Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th
13 at 312.
14

15 In Kwikset, the plaintiffs alleged UCL and FAL claims that
16 Kwikset falsely labeled certain locksets as "Made in the USA" or a
17 similar designation. Allegations that the plaintiffs saw and
18 relied on the labels for their truth in purchasing the Kwikset
19 locksets, and would not have purchased the locksets otherwise,
20 were adequate to claim causation. 51 Cal. 4th at 327-28. The
21 court reasoned, "The marketing industry is based on the premise
22 that labels matter, that consumers will choose one product over
23 another similar product based on its label and various tangible
24 and intangible qualities they may come to associate with a
25 particular source." Id. at 328. Accordingly, the court held that
26 a consumer who alleges that she would not have purchased a
27
28

1 product, but for a misrepresentation contained on the product's
2 label, has sufficiently alleged reliance for purposes of a claim
3 under section 17204 of the UCL. Id. at 330.

4 Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege that
5 she relied on, or even read, misrepresentations or omissions made
6 on the product labels or elsewhere. Plaintiff alleges that she
7 was "exposed to" the product labels. 1AC ¶ 38. The quoted phrase
8 is suspiciously vague, but because Plaintiff had to have had the
9 labels in hand to consume the products, the Court construes this
10 to imply that she read them. She alleges that she paid the amount
11 she did for the products, or purchased them at all, based on
12 specific, purported misrepresentations. Plaintiff has adequately
13 claimed that she read and relied on the misleading label on the
14 RTD containers, resulting in her economic harm.

15
16 On the other hand, Plaintiff has inadequately plead reliance
17 on Defendant's long-term advertising campaign. Plaintiff does not
18 plead that she actually saw and relied upon any particular
19 statements in Defendant's advertising. Plaintiff relies on
20 Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 327, which held that, in the context of
21 a decades-long advertising campaign, a plaintiff need not
22 demonstrate individualized reliance on the specific
23 misrepresentations. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege that
24 Defendant's advertising campaign approached the longevity and
25 pervasiveness of the marketing at issue in Tobacco II.
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1 Plaintiff's claims of reliance on misrepresentations on the
2 website also fail. She does not plead that she read or relied on
3 any statements on the website. In Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183
4 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1363 (2010), the plaintiff likewise did not
5 claim that he ever visited the defendant's website, containing the
6 purported misrepresentations. Instead, the complaint merely
7 alleged that as a "proximate result of [the defendant's] unlawful
8 business practices," the plaintiff and putative class suffered
9 economic damage. Id. The court found this insufficient. Id. at
10 1363-64.
11

12 Similarly, in Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1125-26, upon which
13 Defendant relies, the plaintiff did not allege what the television
14 advertisements or sales material at issue specifically stated, and
15 did not allege when he was exposed to them or which he found
16 material. Id. at 1126.
17

18 In sum, Plaintiff's claim that the "healthy fats" and
19 "nutritious snacks" statements on the label for fourteen ounce
20 Muscle Milk® RTD were misleading, her implication that she read
21 the label and her claim that she relied on the label in deciding
22 to buy the drink, when she otherwise would not have, is sufficient
23 to state her claims. The other representations she complains of
24 are not sufficiently plead.
25

26 IV. Unlawful and Unfair Business Practice

27 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has inadequately alleged
28 unlawful and unfair business practices under the UCL. A

1 "violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of
2 action under the UCL's unlawful prong." Berryman v. Merit Prop.
3 Mgmt., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1554 (2007). For the reasons
4 explained above, Plaintiff has successfully alleged actionable
5 misrepresentation under the UCL, FAL and CLRA, as well as
6 California common law. Dismissal of Plaintiff's claim under the
7 unlawful prong of the UCL is not warranted.

8
9 The California Supreme Court has not established a definitive
10 test to determine whether a business practice is unfair under the
11 UCL. See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular
12 Telephone Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 n.12 (1999) (stating that the
13 test for unfairness in cases involving business competitors is
14 "limited to that context" and does not "relate[] to actions by
15 consumers.").

16
17 California courts of appeal have applied three different
18 tests to evaluate claims by consumers under the UCL's unfair
19 practices prong. See, e.g., Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc.,
20 504 F.3d 718, 735-736 (9th Cir. 2007); Drum v. San Fernando Valley
21 Bar Ass'n, 182 Cal. App. 4th 247, 256 (2010). Under one test, a
22 consumer must allege a "violation or incipient violation of any
23 statutory or regulatory provision, or any significant harm to
24 competition." Drum, 182 Cal. App. 4th at 256. The "public policy
25 which is a predicate to a consumer unfair competition action under
26 the 'unfair prong' of the UCL must be tethered to specific
27 constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions." Id.
28

1 Under the second test, the "unfair prong" requires a consumer
2 to plead that (1) a defendant's conduct "is immoral, unethical,
3 oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers"
4 and (2) "the utility of the defendant's conduct" is outweighed by
5 "the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim." Id. at 257
6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

7
8 Finally, the third test, which is based on the Federal Trade
9 Commission's definition of unfair business practices, requires
10 that "(1) the consumer injury must be substantial; (2) the injury
11 must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers
12 or competition; and (3) it must be an injury that consumers
13 themselves could not reasonably have avoided." Id. (citation and
14 internal quotation marks omitted).

15 In Camacho v. Automobile Club of Southern California, 142
16 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1402-03 (2006), the court declined to apply to
17 consumer cases the first approach, which CelTech adopted for use
18 in antitrust cases. Camacho reasoned that consumer cases are
19 different from antitrust cases and that defining unfairness in
20 connection with a public policy that is tethered to specific
21 constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions did not comport
22 with the broad scope of the UCL. Id. at 1403. Camacho found that
23 this approach did not recognize that a practice can be unfair even
24 if it is not unlawful. Id. Camacho also concluded that Cel-Tech
25 disapproved the second approach to unfairness because
26 "[d]efinitions that are too amorphous in the context of
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1 anticompetitive practices are not converted into satisfactorily
2 precise tests in consumer cases." Id. at 1202. Camacho posited
3 that the key to the definition of unfairness was provided in Cel-
4 Tech itself, which indicated that the Federal Trade Commission Act
5 could be used as guidance. Id. at 1403 (citing Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.
6 4th at 185). Thus, Camacho adopted the third approach described
7 above, reasoning that this definition of unfairness was relevant
8 to consumers and comported with the broad scope of the UCL. Id.

9
10 Several appellate courts and federal district courts have
11 adopted Camacho's reasoning and applied the third test for
12 unfairness in UCL consumer actions. See e.g., Davis v. Ford Motor
13 Credit Co., 179 Cal. App. 4th 581, 596-97 (2009); Daugherty v.
14 American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 839 (2006);
15 Kilgore v. Keybank, 712 F. Supp. 2d 939, 951-52 (N.D. Cal. 2010),
16 overruled on other grounds, 2012 WL 718344 (9th Cir. 2012);
17 Barriga v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2010 WL 1037870, *3 (N.D.
18 Cal.). The Court is persuaded that the California Supreme Court
19 would adopt the Camacho approach to unfairness in UCL consumer
20 cases, and thus applies it in this case.

21
22 In this action, if the product labeling is determined to be
23 false or misleading, the injury to the consumer class as a whole
24 could be substantial, even if the injury to individual consumers
25 is minimal. No benefit is served by false and misleading
26 advertising that outweighs injury to either the class or an
27 individual consumer. While consumers could arguably avoid the
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1 injury by reading the product label in full, misleading labels
2 would appear to qualify as an unfair business practice. Thus,
3 Plaintiff has plead an unfair business practice under the UCL.

4 IV. Unjust Enrichment

5 Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of action for
6 unjust enrichment, asserting, "There is no cause of action in
7 California for unjust enrichment." Durell, 183 Cal. App. 4th at
8 1370 (alterations omitted).
9

10 California courts appear to be split on whether there is an
11 independent cause of action for unjust enrichment. Baggett v.
12 Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1270-71 (C.D. Cal.
13 2007) (applying California law). One view is that unjust
14 enrichment is not a cause of action, or even a remedy, but rather
15 a general principle underlying various legal doctrines and
16 remedies. McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379, 387 (2004).
17 In McBride, the court construed a "purported" unjust enrichment
18 claim as a cause of action seeking restitution. Id. There are at
19 least two potential bases for a cause of action seeking
20 restitution: (1) an alternative to breach of contract damages when
21 the parties had a contract which was procured by fraud or is
22 unenforceable for some reason; and (2) where the defendant
23 obtained a benefit from the plaintiff by fraud, duress,
24 conversion, or similar conduct and the plaintiff chooses not to
25 sue in tort but to seek restitution on a quasi-contract theory.
26 Id. at 388. In the latter case, the law implies a contract, or
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1 quasi-contract, without regard to the parties' intent, to avoid
2 unjust enrichment. Id.

3 Another view is that there is a cause of action for unjust
4 enrichment and its elements are receipt of a benefit and unjust
5 retention of the benefit at the expense of another. Lectrodryer
6 v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (2000); First Nationwide
7 Sav. v. Perry, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1657, 1662-63 (1992).

8
9 Here Plaintiff alleges that Defendant fraudulently induced
10 her to purchase its Muscle Milk® products and retained a benefit
11 at her expense, entitling her to restitution. A quasi-contract
12 may be imposed to prevent Defendant's unjust enrichment.
13 Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment, construed as a cause of
14 action for restitution, does not warrant dismissal.

15 V. Standing

16
17 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under the UCL,
18 FAL and CLRA for failure to allege standing as required under
19 those statutes, and to dismiss all claims for lack of Article III
20 standing. Standing under the UCL and the FAL is narrower than
21 Article III standing in that standing under those statutes
22 "requires a particular kind of injury in fact--loss of 'money or
23 property,'" as well as a "causal connection" between the alleged
24 UCL violation and the purported injury in fact. Rubio v. Capital
25 One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1204 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly,
26 "a UCL plaintiff must always have Article III standing in the form
27 of economic injury." Degelmann, 659 F.3d at 839.

1 As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a
2 misrepresentation, economic injury in the form of her unwarranted
3 purchase of the RTD product, and reliance on the misrepresentation
4 in doing so. This is sufficient to confer standing to pursue her
5 UCL and FAL claims under California law.

6 The CLRA's standing requirement is more easily satisfied than
7 that under the UCL and the FAL, in that the allegedly unlawful
8 practice must only have caused damage to the plaintiff. See
9 Meyer, 45 Cal. 4th at 641 ("[I]n order to bring a CLRA action, not
10 only must a consumer be exposed to an unlawful practice, but some
11 kind of damage must result."). Unlike the UCL and FAL, the
12 statutory language of the CLRA does not on its face require
13 economic damage. Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient.

14 Article III standing is also more easily satisfied. A
15 plaintiff must show: "(1) he or she has suffered an injury in fact
16 that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent;
17 (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and
18 (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable court
19 decision." Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545
20 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008).

21 Defendant's sole argument that Plaintiff lacks Article III
22 standing is that Plaintiff has not alleged an injury. But a
23 plaintiff who has standing under the UCL, as Plaintiff has, will
24 also satisfy Article III standing. See Degelmann, 659 F.3d at
25 839.

1 In sum, Plaintiff has standing to assert all of her claims
2 that are adequately stated.

3 VI. Preemption

4 Defendant seeks dismissal of this action, or, in the
5 alternative, a stay of the proceedings based on the primary
6 jurisdiction doctrine. "The primary jurisdiction doctrine allows
7 courts to stay proceedings or to dismiss a complaint without
8 prejudice pending the resolution of an issue within the special
9 competence of an administrative agency." Clark v. Time Warner
10 Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). "[T]he doctrine is a
11 'prudential' one," rather than one that indicates that the court
12 lacks jurisdiction. Id. No "fixed formula" exists for applying
13 the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Id. at 1115. However, the
14 Ninth Circuit has traditionally examined the following factors:
15 "(1) a need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by
16 Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having
17 regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an
18 industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that
19 (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration." Id.
20 (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).

21 Dismissal and a stay are unwarranted in this case because
22 Defendant has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff's claims under
23 California law require the FDA's scientific or technical
24 expertise. Plaintiff's complaint is not based on the FDA's
25 warning that the product labels violate its regulations. Rather,
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1 the reasonable consumer test will be used to resolve Plaintiff's
2 claims alleging false and misleading representations on the
3 products' packaging. The reasonable consumer determination and
4 other issues involved in Plaintiff's lawsuit are within the
5 expertise of the courts to resolve.

6 CONCLUSION

7
8 Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, except to the
9 extent that it challenges Plaintiff's claims based on the
10 misrepresentations on the fourteen ounce Muscle Milk® RTD
11 packaging. Dismissal is with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file
12 an amended complaint within seven days, remedying the defects
13 addressed above if she is able truthfully to do so without
14 contradicting the allegations in her original complaint.
15 Plaintiff may not add any additional causes of action without
16 leave of the Court. Defendant's request to dismiss or stay the
17 proceedings based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine is denied.
18

19 IT IS SO ORDERED.

20 Dated: 4/11/2012

21 
22 CLAUDIA WILKEN
23 United States District Judge
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